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Are Social Innovation Paradigms Incommensurable? 
 
Abstract This paper calls attention to the problematic use of the concept of social innovation 
which remains undefined despite its proliferation throughout academic and policy discourses. 
Extant research has thus far failed to capture the socio-political contentions which surround 
social innovation. This paper therefore draws upon the work of Thomas Kuhn and conducts a 
paradigmatic analysis of the field of social innovation which identifies two emerging schools: 
one technocratic, the other democratic. The paper identifies some of the key thinkers in each 
paradigm and explains how the struggle between these two paradigms reveals itself to be part 
of a broader conflict between neoliberalism and it opponents and concludes by arguing that 
future research focused upon local contextualized struggles will reveal which paradigm is in 
the ascendancy.  
 










The Undefined Concept 
The concept of social innovation has in recent years crept into the lexicon of academics, 
policymakers and practitioners despite a lack of common understanding regarding its 
meaning and its significance. A range of programmes and policy pronouncements on both 
sides of the Atlantic suggest that social innovation has entered the mainstream (Sinclair and 
Baglioni, 2014). In the United States, the White House in 2009 created a dedicated Office of 
Social Innovation and Civic Participation 1  to coordinate these activities.In the European 
Union, social innovation has become the focus not just of policymakers and practitioners but 
has also resulted in a number of initiatives2 and large collaborative research projects3. Used 
interchangeably with numerous other terms such as social economy, social enterprise, third 
sector and big society, it almost seems to teeter on the brink of definitional bankruptcy when 
in fact it is at the centre of an ideological battle between neoliberalism and its opponents.  
 
The divisions created by the conflict over its definition reflect a broader realisation that, 





 These initiatives include: 
Social Innovation Europe (https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/socialinnovationeurope/about) 
EU Social Innovation Competition (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/social-
innovation/competition/index_en.htm) 
European Investment Bank Social Innovation Tournament (http://institute.eib.org/programmes/social/social-
innovation-tournament/frequently-asked-questions/) 
Naples 2.0 Social Innovation Competition (http://www.euclidnetwork.eu/projects/completed-projects/european-
social-innovation-naples-20.html) 
This Is European Social Innovation (http://www.euclidnetwork.eu/projects/completed-projects/this-is-european-
social-innovation.html) 
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“social innovation is never neutral but always politically and socially constructed” (Nicholls 
and Murdock, 2012: 4). The purpose of this paper is to examine how social innovation can be 
socially and politically constructed to defend or attack neoliberal hegemony, to accept or 
reject the technocratic governance of that hegemony and how it can be used to limit or 
liberate the social and political capacities of citizens. The analysis is inspired by those who 
recognise the need to build an “epistemology sensitive to the inevitable dialectics of struggle 
between forces pursuing radical social innovation oriented to social emancipation and those 
seeking to maintain an asymmetrically organized social order biased towards agencies of 
profit-making, efficient markets, and business-friendly social relations” (Jessop et al, 2013: 
112). Such reflections provide a useful starting point but provoke more questions than 
answers; questions surrounding how these forces operationalize social innovation, if and how 
these forces interact and more fundamentally, whether or not it is possible to compare these 
different emergent schools of social innovation.    
 
The contested conceptual space of social innovation is occupied by two factions whose 
protagonists adopt the same idioms and even demonstrate concern for the same issues, but 
speak past each other in ways that can best be explained by the fact that they operate in 
different paradigmatic worlds where the most basic assumptions are fundamentally opposed. 
This has brought us to the central question posed by this paper: are these paradigms of social 
innovation incommensurable? We cannot begin to answer this question without unpacking 
the concept of incommensurability which stems from the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962), 
whose analysis of scientific revolution refines our understanding of the development of the 





In identifying emerging paradigms of social innovation it is perhaps important to 
acknowledge that the very definition of what a paradigm consists of has itself been the 
subject of some debate, as Masterman (1970) graphically illustrates by offering no less than 
twenty-one variations of the concept. However, the purpose of this paper is not to recreate 
that discussion, instead we shall begin by simply restating Kuhn’s concise position that a 
paradigm is at the fundament of science and is that which actually transforms a group “into a 
profession or, at least, a discipline” (Kuhn, 1962: 19). Therefore the members of these groups 
see the same things when collecting data, they will also use the same terminology and given 
that the focus of these groups is to refine and improve the paradigm’s capacity to solve 
problems, the tools which they use to achieve this aim are also constructed within the 
theoretical confines of the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). Although neither can be described as 
having completed the transition from a group into a discipline, we can identify two paradigms 
under construction which currently occupy the field of social innovation.  
 
Just as Kuhn describes the social sciences as pre-paradigmatic, a similar assessment can be 
made of the construction of social innovation paradigms. Efforts have been made which 
illustrate the complexity of defining social innovation (Phills et al, 2008; Caulier-Grice et al, 
2012; Unger, 2015; Nicholls et al, 2015) and although the influence of Kuhn has already been 
apparent in some existing research (Nicholls, 2010; Dawson and Daniel, 2010; Cajaiba-
Santana, 2014), this overlooks the valuable concept of incommensurability which can 
illuminate our understanding of social innovation. Nevertheless, before addressing the 
concept of incommensurability in finer detail, we should remind ourselves of Kuhn’s 
insistence that, “any study of paradigm-directed or of paradigm-shattering research must 
begin by locating the responsible group or groups” (Kuhn, 1970: 180). Therefore we should 




There are currently two developing schools of social innovation engaged in a conflict over 
the very meaning of the concept (see Table 1). One school – the technocratic paradigm of 
social innovation – is a subgroup (Kuhn, 1970) of neoliberalism, thus placing it at the 
advantage of being the favoured school of a hegemonic project which brings with it the 
support of powerful economic and political advocates who have recognised its capacity to be 
mobilized in order to shore up the broader neoliberal project. The other school – the 
democratic paradigm of social innovation – is advocated by opponents of neoliberalism who 
recognise in it a possibility for creating spaces in which alternatives to the neoliberal project 
can be pursued. 
 
Table 1. Paradigms of social innovation  
 
 Technocratic Democratic 
Knowledge Construction Expert Community 
Effects Depoliticizing Politicizing 
Power distribution Vertical Horizontal 
 
 
It is more difficult to identify the democratic school as a subgroup as it has a more 
fragmented inheritance which is made even more difficult to trace as it appears to reject the 
very practices described by Kuhn as those which enable the construction of a scientific 
community (see Moulaert and Van Dyck, 2013; Moulaert et al, 2013; Jessop et al, 2013 and 
Ranciere 1991). Therefore, tempting as it may be to simply move towards a comparative 
6 
 
evaluation of both approaches and somehow reach a definitive conclusion that one paradigm 
carries more potential to meet human needs than the other, there is an immediate question 
confronting us, raised by Kuhn’s own theory: whether or not such an evaluation is actually 
possible or instead if these paradigms are incommensurable.    
 
Incommensurability 
The potential incommensurability – literally that which has no common measure – of social 
innovation paradigms must be considered given Kuhn’s description of how the battle between 
paradigms is not won by the strength of evidence, instead it refers to a situation where the 
“proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds… the two 
groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same 
direction” (Kuhn, 1962: 149). Many have drawn comparisons between this description and a 
gestalt shift (Figure 1, below), although Kuhn (1962) himself described such comparisons as 
misleading. Indeed as Sharrock and Read (2002) point out, in a visual gestalt people can 
switch back and forth from one to the other, however Kuhn’s theory implies that scientists 
can do this only once and that their choice is both permanent and defined by their paradigm. 
This emphasises the entrenched worlds inhabited by adherents of the technocratic and 
democratic social innovation schools, their very perception of social needs, problems and the 












The idea that adherents of different paradigms operate in different worlds leads Kuhn (1962) 
to conclude that the only way for a scientist to fully understand a paradigm is to undergo a 
conversion, or paradigm shift, something which takes place within a period of conflict or 
scientific revolutions. This is a status which, through the course of this analysis, will be 
revealed as being particularly relevant to any discussion of social innovation. As will become 
clear, of particular significance is how Kuhn draws comparisons between the effects of a 
scientific revolution and a political revolution, in which he concludes that the absence of a 
shared capacity for evaluation means that “the parties to a revolutionary conflict must finally 
resort to the techniques of mass persuasion” (Kuhn, 1962: 93). It is this conflict that we are 
witnessing in the field of social innovation amongst policymakers, practitioners and 
academics and in order to better understand it, the first step should be to reveal the 
protagonists and their arguments. The schools outlined below - technocratic and democratic - 
encapsulate the characteristics and objectives of these nascent paradigms whilst forging the 
key points of contestation in a field which has been described as witnessing an absence of 
disagreement and even a “denial of politics” (Larsson and Brandsen, 2016: 223). 
 
Technocratic Social Innovation 
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The Neoliberal Paradigm 
Policymakers in Europe have contributed towards the discursive construction of technocratic 
social innovation by positioning it within a free market frame. The language used when 
promoting social innovation reveals this to some extent and indeed the assertion outlined in 
the Guide to Social Innovation, produced by the European Commission provides us with a 
key example: “Europe has a head-start. It is ideally placed to take a lead and capture first-
mover benefits when it comes to implementing social innovations” (European Commission, 
2013: 10). Therefore some European policymakers are constructing a discourse which sets 
the agenda for social innovations to operate in terms of new markets and competition, a 
neoliberal disciplinary technique which provides a glimpse into a deeper relationship between 
the ideology of the free market and the technocratic school of social innovation.    
 
The technocratic paradigm of social innovation cannot be fully understood without 
comprehending its relationship to neoliberalism. In a period of economic crisis, when the 
neoliberal project has come under intense scrutiny, the mobilization of social innovation is a 
prime example of the deployment of “flanking mechanisms” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 
374), discourses and conducts directed towards civil society and designed to maintain the 
hegemony of the neoliberal faith, particularly when threatened with crisis and resistance. 
Moreover, when considering the roots of the neoliberal project, it becomes clear that the 
vague position occupied by the field of social innovation somewhere between the market and 
the state reflects some fundamental issues at the heart of the development of that project, 
where neoliberals agreed on what should be destroyed but not on what should be constructed, 
“this problem went back at least as far as Keynes’ contention that Hayek was unable to 
demonstrate ‘where to draw the line’ on the role of the state in the economy” (Peck, 2008: 
26). Nevertheless, technocratic social innovation offers neoliberals a vehicle to complement 
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their ‘roll back’ policies with ‘roll out’ initiatives (Peck and Tickell, 2002), designed within a 
paradigm that solidifies neoliberal thinking in the blurred boundaries of the market and the 
state, whilst simultaneously stifling potential resistance to their hegemonic project. 
 
The neoliberal support for the technocratic paradigm stems from its advocates being 
“increasingly concerned with the roll-out of new forms of institutional ‘hardware’” (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002: 389). Therefore it is important to view this approach to social innovation as not 
just another site for neoliberalism to shore up its project but also as part of a broader 
“political project to reengineer the state” (Bockman, 2012: 310). It is important at this point 
to emphasise that this ‘reengineering’ takes many different forms based on the socio-political 
context. Indeed just as neoliberalism is an incomplete, even messy project (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002), so too is the emerging technocratic paradigm of social innovation which it 
supports and informs. As such, when observing the technocratic paradigm in action we can 
expect it to reflect the methods of its theoretical base which “like an ideological parasite, 
neoliberalism both occupies and draws energy from its various host organisms” (Peck, 2013: 
144). Consequently, further research is required in order to explore in greater detail how this 
is operationalized in specific socio-political contexts, however at this point it is possible to 
outline more sharply the processes by which social innovation is produced by the 
technocratic school. 
 
Despite the continuous invocation of the term ‘social’ throughout the technocratic social 
innovation literature it is frequently couched in terms which privilege market competition, 
with the ‘social’ repositioned within a commodified frame and an emphasis on ‘supply and 
demand’ as well as the potential for increased efficiency and savings that can be made to 
public finances (BEPA, 2010; Murray et al, 2010; Mulgan, 2006; Leadbeater and Meadway, 
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2008). Nevertheless, Mulgan (2006) does attempt to construct a dichotomy between social 
innovation and other forms of innovation, highlighting that, “social innovation refers to 
innovative activities and services that are motivated by the goal of meeting a social need and 
that are predominantly diffused through organisations whose primary purposes are social. 
Business innovation is generally motivated by profit maximisation and diffused through 
organisations that are primarily motivated by profit maximisation” (: 146). However this 
attempted clarification falls short of providing an effective distinction given the scope for 
interpretation when we consider the difficulties posed by attempting to identify the ‘primary’ 
motivations of organisations. As we have already clarified, this ambiguity inherent within the 
technocratic approach to social innovation reflects its neoliberal foundations.  
 
In some areas the ambiguity which the technocratic school occupies and thrives upon has 
already been the subject of extant research, one such area is that of social enterprise (for more 
on the definition of social enterprise see: Pearce, 2003; Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; 
Teasdale, 2012; Peredo and McLean, 2006). Despite articulating anti-hierarchical rhetoric in 
order to attack the welfare state, this is quickly discarded when the technocratic school 
discuss the importance of social entrepreneurship. Indeed, it becomes readily apparent that 
one of common identifiers of the adherents to the technocratic paradigm is a reverence for the 
social entrepreneur, leading to assertions that, “social innovation holds the key to our social 
ills. Social entrepreneurs are the people most able to deliver that innovation” (Leadbeater, 
1997: 20). The trope of the heroic entrepreneur being espoused by the technocratic school 
should not surprise us given their neoliberal inspiration.  
 
One the key theorists who has become a reference point for those wishing to perpetuate the 
discourse of the heroic entrepreneur in the economy is Joseph Schumpeter who asserts that to 
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be considered one of these agents of change in the economy, “requires aptitudes that are 
present in only a small fraction of the population and that define the entrepreneurial type as 
well as the entrepreneurial function” (Schumpeter, 2011: 132). Drawing upon Schumpeter’s 
theory of creative destruction, the technocratic school inject the ‘social’ to naturalise the 
connection between the social entrepreneur and social innovation (Dees, 2001), all of which 
is a recurring theme in the literature of that paradigm. The depiction of the dynamic social 
entrepreneur (Dees and Economy, 2007) is mobilized to reinforce the discourses of the 
efficient market expert by the technocratic school, but this adulation of expertise is not 
restricted to the economy, it is also extended to government and nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the neoliberal forms of governance which are characterised by a privileging 
of technocracy. 
Technocratic Governance 
Technocratic social innovation is interwoven within the neoliberal governmentality of post-
Fordism and thus when looking at the ‘service delivery’ mechanisms of some governments in 
Europe and beyond we can see that this approach to social innovation becomes a euphemism 
for more than just an opportunity to ‘innovate’. Instead, it provides for the soft privatisation 
of services that were once the sole domain of the Keynesian welfare state. As Moulaert et al 
(2013) observe, “SI is increasingly embraced as a ‘new’ approach to solving the crisis of the 
welfare state, by creating new jobs in the ‘cheap’ social economy and reorganizing the 
welfare system through commodification and privatization of some of its services and the 
more efficient restructure of others” (: 17-18). The focus on efficiency drives many of the 
discourses surrounding technocratic social innovation but so too does the convenient fiction 
that the inclusion of organisations from the third sector and social enterprise enables such 




The importance of driving towards more ‘efficient’ public services is emphasised by the 
technocratic school as being a crucial response to the economic crisis, which has in turn 
provided a perfect opportunity to carry out such reforms. Therefore, technocratic social 
innovation is mobilized in ways similar to that described by Bunt et al (2010) in their 
discussion paper Schumpeter Comes to Whitehall, where, “many aspects of what now 
constitute public sector activity would be opened up to a wider range of social and 
community organisations and charities to deliver innovative, diverse approaches that respond 
to public demand” (Bunt et al, 2010: 19). The focus on the expansion of choice and the 
recasting of the role of the citizen as a consumer of public services is a familiar market trope 
(Osbourne and Gaeblar, 1992; Hood, 1991; Le Grand, 2006) and may lead some to question 
how the neoliberal approach can be described as technocratic - this will be elaborated in 
greater detail below - but at this point we can at least begin to comprehend the relationship 
between the technocratic paradigm and broader neoliberal ideas. 
 
The recruitment of social innovation in the incursion against public services captures the 
attraction of the technocratic paradigm for those seeking to maintain the neoliberal order as it 
provides an opportunity to synchronise roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism under the more 
palatable rubric of efficiency, necessity and empowerment. This is achieved through “the 
mobilization of the ‘little platoons’ in the shape of (local) voluntary and faith-based 
associations in the service of neoliberal goals” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 390). Moreover, 
these ‘little platoons’ may co-operate with this agenda in the belief that they can achieve at 
least some change within a hegemonic neoliberal system. This may prove to be a valid tactic 
but it is accompanied by the risk of seeking to be an agent of change within a system, only to 
find later that participation in the system has changed the agent. This risk becomes all the 
more conspicuous when witnessing the pleas from the technocratic school for more private 
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investment, payment by results and scaling-up, amongst a whole host of objectives which 
embed organisations in neoliberal discourses and conducts of competition.    
  
One way in which the technocratic school exerts influence over the internal dynamics of 
organisations is to draw comparisons with organisations in the private sector. A prime 
example surrounds the seemingly perpetual concern of the technocrats regarding the capacity 
of organisations and initiatives to ‘scale-up’ their efforts in ways comparable to initiatives in 
the private sector. Naturally, the solutions to such problems are also to be found within the 
framework of the market. Thus the problem of scaling-up is reconfigured into a problem 
caused by a lack of funding and leads to some such as BEPA (2010) lamenting that “social 
ventures” experience unique challenges in terms of scaling up and “ultimately this leads to a 
lack of funding for social entrepreneurs and a fragile market for valuing social innovation, 
which means that special forms of seed funding are needed to promote and test pilot cases” (: 
103). From here we can see how such concerns can lead to the emergence of new and 
‘innovative’ forms of funding such as social impact bonds (SIBs) which position socially 
innovative organisations as service providers, enmeshed within a ‘payment by results’ system 
with a specific view towards tapping into the experience of those from a private investment 
background in sourcing funding for these organisations (for a critical discussion of SIBs and 
social investment see McHugh et al, 2013; Dowling and Harvie, 2014).  
 
Therefore, just as Kuhn (1962) explains that the paradigm determines the puzzles which are 
to be solved, the technocratic paradigm has determined that one puzzle to be solved in social 
innovation is the issue of scaling-up (Mulgan, 2007; Schwab Foundation, 2013; Gabriel, 
2014). The solution is then also found within the same paradigm, private sector funding, but 
this goes even further, because the emphasis on investment inevitably leads to discussions 
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surrounding the potential ‘returns on investment’ that are possible from the results achieved 
and how such results and returns may be calculated. 
 
Calculating the returns on investment in social innovation is a key characteristic of the 
technocratic paradigm, marked by anxieties that, “measuring the production (impact) of 
social innovation is a priority for policymaking as ‘what you do not measure, you do not 
achieve’. However, the value produced does not easily translate into quantifiable benefits” 
(BEPA, 2010: 55). As a consequence there have been determined efforts to construct the 
apparatus necessary to meet these anxieties, such as the Social Return on Investment (SROI) 
which aims to provide the data required by policymakers and investors (Nicholls et al, 2009; 
Reeder et al, 2012) as well as the emergence of initiatives such as the Social Stock 
Exchange
4
. All of which helps to further entrench organisations within the frame of market 
discipline which dominates the discourses of the technocratic paradigm. Therefore, despite 
being seemingly displaced and disguised by the rhetoric of efficiency, necessity and 
empowerment, what becomes increasingly apparent is that the technocratic paradigm of 
social innovation represents the more acceptable face of neoliberalism, which instead of hair 
shirt austerity and public sector retrenchment, evokes “a feel-good emphasis on human and 
social capital building, even community empowerment; Thatcher’s infamously blunt ‘there’s 
no such thing as society’ mutated into the smoke-and-mirrors rhetoric of David Cameron’s 
Big Society” (Peck, 2013: 147). The adherents of the technocratic paradigm thus 
conceptualise social capital and community empowerment through the lens of its own key 
thinkers. As we have already seen, one such thinker is Schumpeter, whose thesis on creative 
destruction and the role of the entrepreneur, has been embraced by the technocratic school. 
That same thesis not only valorizes the entrepreneur as the expert of the market but also 





valorizes ‘experts’ of democracy and it is at this point we can see that although messy, 
variegated and networked, the technocratic paradigm is underpinned by forces seeking to 
reinforce rather than challenge the vertical distributions of power in society.       
 
In many ways, the adoption of Schumpeter (2011) by the technocratic school is perhaps both 
astute and unsurprising. In the wake of the financial crisis, it was difficult for neoliberals to 
deny that their project was facing real pressure and scrutiny, therefore Schumpeter - whose 
analysis forlornly predicts the collapse of the capitalist system – presented neoliberals with a 
useful resource from a critical friend who forewarns the eventual collapse of capitalism 
whilst valorizing its key agents, such as the entrepreneur. Moreover, the creative destruction 
described by Schumpeter provides the technocratic school with a theoretical pretext for the 
sweeping away of ‘old’ and ‘bureaucratic’ (primarily publicly owned) institutions in favour 
of ‘new’ and ‘innovative’ (primarily market style) programmes necessitated by austere times 
following the economic crisis (see Leadbeater and Meadway, 2008; Bunt et al, 2010). Thus in 
the technocratic school, the realm of the social becomes absorbed into a paradigm of 
competition.  
Socio-political Capacities 
The discussion surrounding the ‘embeddedness’ or ‘disembeddedness’ of markets has 
produced some of the most notable literature in the social sciences (Polanyi, 1944; 
Granovetter, 1985) and although contributing to this debate in some detail may prove fruitful, 
we simply do not have the space to explore this with any justice. Instead, we shall focus upon 
the impact of Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’ on social relations which 
presents us with a specific case that is difficult to reconcile with any interpretation of socio-
political empowerment. Nevertheless, policymakers and their advisers persist with claims 
that, “some of the most important sectors for growth over the next few decades are linked to 
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the development of human and social capital” (BEPA, 2010: 15). Such claims which link 
social capital and economic growth not only reveals an instrumentalist interpretation of social 
relations which encourages the accumulation of social capital as a gateway to the 
accumulation of other forms of capital (see Leadbeater, 1997), but also exposes a 
fundamental contradiction when adopting the Schumpeterian approach to social innovation. 
Embracing an instrumentalist approach serves to reinforce, rather than disrupt, vertical 
distributions of power within social relations which reflect existing inequalities (Lin, 2000). 
For example, the exposure of workers to the dynamics of creative destruction limits their 
opportunities to build and maintain social relations which are disrupted by destructive market 
forces driven by discourses of competition that emphasise increased efficiencies and results 
modelled upon potential returns to investors. Nevertheless, an instrumentalist and competitive 
interpretation of social relations persists within this paradigm and given the neoliberal 
underpinnings of the technocratic school, this understanding of empowerment through the 
development of a competitive self should come as no surprise (Foucault 2010; Lemke, 2001). 
These efforts by the technocratic school to enmesh the development of subjectivities with a 
competitive framework can only be fully understood when analysed within a specific context 
and deserves the attention of scholars from a multitude of disciplines. 
 
Nonetheless, what is already clear is that the competitive market frame embraced by the 
technocratic paradigm raises questions concerning its capacity to empower citizens when we 
consider its theoretical underpinnings in relation to social capital. The reference point of 
Schumpeter also unravels any potential claims that the technocratic approach is built upon 
theoretical perspectives which empower citizens or challenge inequalities considering that 
“Schumpeter was inclined to see the world from an elitarian perspective. He regarded clusters 
of talented people as the driving force behind economic and political history” (Giersch, 1984: 
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104). Interestingly, this ‘elitarian’ perspective was not restricted to the economy and emerges 
when considering Schumpeter’s analysis of the realm of the political.    
 
What appears to be missing from the technocratic literature which adopts the Schumpeterian 
analysis of innovation is the theory of democracy that Schumpeter also promotes within the 
same thesis. Contrary to the rhetoric of empowerment so well-rehearsed by the technocratic 
school of social innovation, Schumpeter is a champion of the elitist theory of democracy, 
extending the logic of competition and markets to the realm of the political by asserting that, 
“to simplify matters we have restricted the kind of competition for leadership which is to 
define democracy, to free competition for a free vote” (Schumpeter, 2011: 271). In 
understanding Schumpeter’s approach to democracy we also gain further insight into his 
broader thesis which seeks to preserve the vertical distributions of power. Indeed, it seems 
difficult to reconcile Schumpeter with any sense of socio-political empowerment when he 
asserts that politics should be a profession given that the masses are a politically incapable 
collective whose democratic participation extends only to voting for their leaders, after 
which, “…they must understand that, once they have elected an individual, political action is 
his business and not theirs” (Schumpeter, 2011: 295). The technocratic paradigm of social 
innovation is therefore underpinned by a faith in experts such as entrepreneurs and techniques 
of governance which seek to displace and disguise political power as well as a commitment 
to the preservation and extension of the competitive neoliberal consensus which reinforces 
the vertical distributions of power within society.      
 
Democratic Social Innovation  
The Counter-Hegemonic Paradigm 
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The mobilization of the technocratic paradigm of social innovation to shore up the neoliberal 
consensus has not gone unnoticed and other scholars who are also located within the field of 
social innovation have for some time been constructing their own paradigm within which 
they make reference to similar phenomena (social capital, empowerment) but, as Kuhn 
(1962) reminds us, these researchers see different things. Nevertheless, being adherents to 
one paradigm does not exclude them from analysing the motivations of those located within 
another. An example of this stems from Martinelli (2013) who identifies that in terms of the 
third way or the big society, “an ambiguous convergence has thus occurred between top-
down neoliberal restructuring strategies, on the one hand, and bottom-up mobilization of 
users and civil society for better or more effective services on the other, which has somewhat 
legitimized the deregulation, liberalization and privatization processes” (:348). This 
reinforces the analysis that adherents to the different paradigms of social innovation are 
locked in the type of struggle which Kuhn described as a scientific revolution and compared 
to the characteristics of a political revolution. 
 
The struggle between the two paradigms of social innovation is therefore firmly rooted in the 
nexus of existing distributions of power, in which neoliberalism is hegemonic. Nevertheless, 
spaces have opened up where alternative approaches to meeting human needs can be 
developed and which do not valorize free market thinking. As Moulaert and Nussbaumer 
(2005) invite us to imagine in the context of local and regional development, there is a 
necessity for a “broader existential ontology in which the (market) economic rationale and 
technological innovation are only supporting rationales” (: 46). Indeed in a later work, Jessop 
and other social innovation scholars argue that, “extending the social economy provides a 
basis for resisting capital's increasing hegemony over society as a whole” (2013: 118). Thus, 
having located where some key tensions lie, it is clear that social innovation can only be 
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understood by recognising the socio-political struggles taking place in practice and in theory. 
 
A further step towards refining our understanding of the struggle taking place between the 
two paradigms of social innovation can be achieved by identifying the contours of the 
democratic social innovation paradigm which involves “countering or overcoming 
conservative forces that are eager to strengthen or preserve social exclusion situations” 
(Moulaert et al, 2013: 17). It should be reiterated at the outset that although this school of 
thought rejects the market led rationale of technocratic social innovation, this does not mean 
it completely eschews the economy. In fact, Moulaert and Ailenei (2005) explain that 
engagement with the economy can actually form part of a broader strategy, thus they assert 
that “social innovation in the economy is mainly about the (re)introduction of social justice 
into production and allocation systems” (: 2037). As shall be elaborated upon later in this 
paper, the democratic paradigm of social innovation can best be understood through the same 
prism of those examining the development of ‘horizontalism’ (Sitrin and Azzellini, 2014) and 
those such as Gibson-Graham (2003) who perceive community economies as a “project of 
deconstructing the hegemony of capitalism and elaborating multiple axes of economic 
diversity is an emancipatory project of repoliticizing the economy” (:126). Therefore in 
contrast to the privileging by the technocratic school of the heroic entrepreneur, the 
democratic school represents a rejection of such hierarchical figureheads or elites, sometimes 
engraving this rejection into the very names of their organizations such as Fabrica Sin Patron, 
an exemplar of the recuperated workplace movement in Argentina (Sitrin, 2012) or through 
the exclamations of activists in New York’s Zucotti Park that ‘we are the 99%’ (Graeber, 
2013). 
 
Having briefly outlined the form of the emerging democratic paradigm, the question we must 
ask is: how do adherents to this school expect their aims to be achieved? One answer can be 
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found when considering the Integrated Area Development (IAD) framework of social 
innovation constructed by Moulaert et al (2005) which reveals the emancipatory aims that 
can motivate the protagonists of the democratic school: seeking to meet human needs 
(particularly alienated needs), raising participation levels (particularly of marginalized 
groups) and empowerment through greater access to resources and increased social and 
political capacities. This discussion of increasing such capacities by Moulaert and his 
colleagues begins to reveal the objective of political mobilization which characterizes the 
emerging democratic paradigm. This objective can also be identified in the notion of 
‘autogestion’ articulated by Lefebvre (2009) whose nuanced conceptualisation of new forms 
of self-management recognises that they contain the potential for the construction of new 
democratic spaces not only in workplaces but also in communities, towns and cities (Butler, 
2012; Brenner, 2001) whilst realising that constructing such spaces involves an ongoing 
struggle rather than an outcome, much like democracy itself (Elden, 2004). Moreover, the 
critical analysis Lefebvre undertakes of the state challenges any misconception of the 
democratic school as simply being statist through his recognition that state support for the 
logic of market competition can be disguised as decentralization or even democratization thus 
preserving existing power asymmetries in society (Lefebvre, 2001; Brenner, 2001). 
 
The type of participation therefore being referred to within the democratic paradigm thus 
reveals another point of conflict with their technocratic opponents who pursue a competitive 
neoliberalized interpretation of social relations, whereas the democratic school view social 
innovation, ‘more like a reinterpretation or reproduction of already lived social relations but 
within new contexts’ (Moulaert and Ailenei, 2005: 2050). We can therefore conclude that in 
contrast to the creative destruction of social relations ingrained within the technocratic 
paradigm of social innovation, the democratic paradigm is concerned with the creative 
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transformation of social relations. Thus, empowerment through increased socio-political 
capacities has a very different meaning within the democratic paradigm as it opens, rather 
than closes, the possibilities for alternatives to neoliberal hegemony. 
 
The Rejection of Technocratic Governance 
The pursuit of empowerment through increased participation can be claimed by proponents of 
both paradigms of social innovation however this provides another example where each camp 
actually perceives and articulates different things. Rejecting the view of the technocratic 
paradigm which repositions citizens as consumers, those within the democratic paradigm 
sometimes literally describe themselves as being involved in the construction of ‘other 
worlds’. One example of this stems from the work of Gibson-Graham and Roelvnik (2013) 
who draw a link between the objectives of social innovation and the creation of community 
economies, concluding that “these innovative projects are, at the same time, projects of 
inclusion, whether geared towards meeting the material needs of the marginalized, opening 
social arenas to the previously excluded, or giving ‘voice’ to those who have had little or no 
say in political life” (: 455). It is important to emphasise at this point that those identified as 
being within the democratic paradigm do not form a homogenous bloc, quite the reverse. 
Many of these projects will be embedded across a variety of contexts and situated within a 
multitude of struggles which can be described as “pockets of resistance…of all sizes, of 
different colours, of varying shapes” (Marcos, 1997).What can thus broadly be said is that 
these projects embrace cooperation rather than competition and seek to organise through 
horizontal networks of solidarity rather than being disciplined by the market logic of 
technocratic neoliberal governance. 
 
Therefore within the democratic paradigm the objective of social innovation is to challenge 
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those practices which continue to exclude groups and to create spaces where these groups can 
be heard. Adherents to the democratic paradigm confront their technocratic opponents with 
the assertion that, “the satisfaction of basic needs cannot be guaranteed through either 
competitive market allocation mechanisms, or free-market democracy” (Moulaert and 
Nussbaumer, 2005: 50). Moreover, the democratic school have demonstrated an awareness of 
how socially innovative organisations and initiatives which may offer an alternative to 
neoliberalized solutions are themselves at risk of being co-opted by the technocratic paradigm 
through neoliberal conducts of governance. Indeed it would be an act of hubris to discount 
the possibility that the efforts of researchers and policymakers may also be exposed to the 
same risk.  
 
Concerns regarding organisations being co-opted are voiced by Jessop (2002) who highlights 
the strategic role of the social economy or third sector in sustaining neoliberalism through the 
deployment of a flanking strategy – neocommunitarianism - which is “linked to attempts to 
manage issues of social exclusion and social cohesion at the urban level even in the most 
neoliberal cases” (: 464). In response to this analysis Gerometta et al (2005) argue that civil 
society should not supersede the state at a local level but instead should only ever be there to 
support it, indeed these researchers argue that “truly public, and local social economy 
experiences need welfare state support” (:2008). Moreover, the defence of welfare state 
support does not mean that democratic social innovation scholars should be described as 
‘statist’, but instead are expressing concerns that the capture of social innovation by the 
technocratic paradigm must be opposed especially when the result is that “social innovation 
becomes an alibi for the state to abdicate its social responsibility while cutting public 
spending” (Martinelli, 2013: 356). These concerns relate to an increasingly complex 
landscape in the governance of many states which can best be understood through the lens of 
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what Foucault (2010) identified as neoliberal governmentality.  
 
The link between the technocratic paradigm of social innovation and neoliberal 
governmentality is addressed in some detail by Swyngedouw (2005) who concludes that 
these new forms of governance do not represent a decline of state power as they are in fact 
mostly instituted and controlled by the state. He argues that the state mobilizes governance as 
a method of maintaining its own legitimacy in times of crisis and pursuing policies which 
would normally meet resistance from civil society actors. Moreover, within the context of 
austerity and ever deceasing pools of public funded support, many civil society actors find 
themselves enmeshed within forms of governance which force them to compete to be 
efficient service delivery providers that play by the rules of the neoliberal game. 
Consequently, the technologies of ‘governance’ are presented as a gateway towards civil 
society empowerment when in fact these represent a Trojan horse for reducing the space of 
the political and consolidating the primacy of the market (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). 
This concern echoes the conclusion of Moulaert and Nussbaumer (2005) that “the satisfaction 
of basic needs is scarcely present in contemporary national political agendas, which are 
increasingly oriented towards ‘pleasing the free market’ by deregulating and regulating in 
favour of free-riding capital and profit-oriented competition” (: 50). These analyses further 
clarify the existence of two paradigms of social innovation which are in conflict, a struggle 
between a technocratic paradigm imbued with a neoliberal doxa which “seeks the end of 
politics” (Chambers, 2012: 73) through the technologies of governance and another, 
democratic paradigm which seeks to disrupt the neoliberal consensus and politicize those 




When returning to the question of whether or not social innovation paradigms are 
incommensurable we must confront the issue of which type of interactions are actually 
possible between these schools of thought. Although the initial thesis of incommensurability 
outlined by Kuhn suggested that little dialogue between paradigms was possible, in later 
works he revises this position to suggest that although interaction between paradigms is 
difficult, it is not impossible, “in applying the term incommensurability to theories, I had 
intended only to insist that there was no common language within which both could be fully 
expressed and which could therefore be used in a point-by-point comparison between them” 
(Kuhn, 1976: 189). The discursive emphasis articulated by Kuhn strikes at the very heart of 
our analysis of the development of a democratic social innovation paradigm, by recalling the 
comparison that Kuhn made between scientific and political revolutions. It is through the 
political act of articulating Voice, being heard - or more importantly - being understood, that 
we can understand how the democratic paradigm of social innovation challenges its 
technocratic counterpart. 
 
The connection between expressing Voice and the fundamentals of democracy stretch back 
millennia to the works of Aristotle, but in contemporary times the work of Jacques Ranciere 
has reasserted the importance of such simple, but powerful acts. Ranciere (2004) cites the 
work of French nineteenth century writer Ballanche when recalling the actions of the plebians 
on the Aventine Hill in ancient Rome who demanded a treaty with the patricians and were 
met by the response that the plebians were capable only of noise rather than speech, which 
could be exercised only by free men. Therefore the articulation of Voice is inextricably 
linked to the enacting of democracy since it is, “the speech of those who should not be 
speaking, those who were not really speaking beings” (Ranciere, 2004: 5). The relevance of 
the discursive turn by Kuhn (1976) concerning the application of the concept of 
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incommensurability to the paradigms we have identified becomes ever more apparent when 
considering the analysis by Ranciere regarding the centrality of Voice. Nevertheless, even 
being understood is not enough for democracy to be enacted, for this to be achieved Ranciere 
argues that there must be disagreement, an “instituting of a quarrel that challenges the 
incorporated, perceptible evidence of an inegalitarian logic. This quarrel is politics” (2004: 
5). Therefore it is politics which produces the space which enables, at the very least, 
interaction between the two emergent paradigms of social innovation we have identified. 
 
The politics which Ranciere describes offers the prospect of an enhanced understanding of 
the conflict which exists between social innovation paradigms as “politics is primarily 
conflict over the existence of a common stage and over the existence and status of those 
present on it” (1999: 26-7). This common stage is brought about by those – such as the 
plebians of ancient Rome – who previously had no Voice, asserting a place in the order of 
things. Indeed as Ranciere clarifies: “the essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, 
as the presence of two worlds in one” (2001: Thesis 8). This description captures precisely 
the thrust of our analysis, that the developing paradigmatic worlds of technocratic and 
democratic social innovation cannot be subjected to the measurement of a comparative 
evaluation but can interact through the rupture caused by the adherents of the democratic 
school demanding to be heard as equals of those adhering to a technocratic school supported 
by the advocates and technologies of neoliberal hegemony. We obviously cannot expect any 
rupture to be welcomed by the technocratic paradigm, indeed just as Kuhn (1962) explains 
that anomalies which do not fit with a paradigm are ignored by its adherents, or as Ranciere 
(2004) describes the actions of the patricians of ancient Rome in dismissing and ignoring the 
demands of the plebians, so too can we expect a similar response directed towards the 
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democratic school of social innovation by their technocratic counterparts. However we must 
ask how such ignorance is made possible and in what ways it may be sustained.    
 
It is Ranciere who offers a valuable way to understand how adherents to the nascent 
neoliberalized technocratic paradigm will have developed their own ontology and how they 
will seek to maintain it. For Ranciere (2001), the police (or what he also refers to as the 
partition of the sensible) distributes spaces and functions within society and thus determines 
who is seen and who can be heard (or more specifically, who can be understood). Therefore 
in terms of the technocratic school of social innovation, that which is sensible consists of 
those initiatives which are co-opted by neoliberal governmentality and its experts, those 
organisations which embrace the marketized framing of the ‘social good’ and those 
individuals who epitomise the narrative of the ‘heroic entrepreneur’ amongst others. Of 
relevance here is Ranciere’s claim that the ‘partitioning of the sensible’ – much like the 
neoliberalization described by Peck et al (2010) - is never complete. Not everyone is assigned 
a place or is ‘heard’, thus Ranciere describes those who are outside the distribution of the 
sensible as those who have no part, those who are neither seen nor ‘heard’ by the police.  
 
Just as the technocratic paradigm constructs roles and functions and gives a place to certain 
organisations and initiatives whilst claiming it has been inclusive, so too there exists those 
organisations which are excluded, those initiatives which are not counted and it is these 
groups and those initiatives which ‘have no part’, to borrow Ranciere’s phrase, which may be 
attracted to the democratic social innovation paradigm and which threaten to disrupt the 
neoliberal consensus shored up by the technocratic social innovation paradigm. In other 
words, “if a social innovation wants to become radical, it has to react to the overall 
constitution of societal organization in which old and new forms of authoritarianism are 
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intertwined” (Novy and Hammer, 2007: 211). These social innovations which find 
themselves to be outsiders are those which have not only refused to accept the technocratic 
paradigm but also reject the neoliberalization which informs it and as a consequence may find 
that they are dismissed as radicals or extremists who are “relegated to a domain outside the 
consensual post-democratic arrangement; they are rendered inexistent” (Swyngedouw, 2014: 
177). Nevertheless, it is their very exclusion which may also provide the space within which 
these groups may be able to organise and coalesce around common goals, in other words, 
“the partition excludes, and at the same time it makes a new form of participation possible” 
(Chambers, 2012: 70).  
 
The idea that the space for the democratic paradigm emerges as a result of the exclusion of a 
group or section of society bears a striking resemblance to broader analyses of the 
development of opposition to the neoliberal doxa which informs the technocratic paradigm 
where the processes of “deep neoliberalization has created new basing points, strategic 
targets and weak spots” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 399). It is for this reason that the 
significance of social innovation as a battleground between paradigms becomes increasingly 
apparent as it is in this area where neoliberalization is theoretically and practically at its most 
vulnerable. One example of this surfaced amidst the collapse of Spain’s housing bubble, with 
the shortcomings of financial speculation resulting in the emergence of Plataforma de 
Afectados por la Hipoteca
5
 which has campaigned against the evictions of families, 
reasserting housing as a basic need rather than a profitable investment. These weaknesses of 
neoliberalism perhaps also explain the interest and support from neoliberal governments and 
institutions for the technocratic paradigm which can be mobilized to shore up the neoliberal 
consensus in times of crisis. The technocratic paradigm of social innovation is therefore 





activated to protect these vulnerabilities and one way it does this is by depoliticizing issues 
and spaces where neoliberalism is at its most anomalous. 
 
Just as Kuhn explained that the adherents to an established paradigm will seek to explain 
away or even ignore those anomalies which threaten to undermine it, neoliberals have 
proactively mobilized the technocratic paradigm of social innovation, recognising that it can 
neatly mirror the broader processes of neoliberalization which are “increasingly technocratic 
in form and therefore superficially ‘depoliticized’, acquiring the privileged status of a taken-
for-granted or foundational policy orientation” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 389). The 
technocratic social innovation paradigm thus offers the capacity to subvert potential dissent 
through the depoliticization of issues which may expose the fallibility of neoliberalism. 
Given the spatial focus of social innovation it will carry out this depoliticization in the very 
poorest and most marginalised communities where the contradictions of neoliberal logic are 
laid bare. As Ranciere explains, depoliticization supports the prevailing consensus by 
quelling contention and consequently, rather than spaces of politics being opened, the 
discourse is characterised by “asking experts for solutions, and to discussing them with 
representatives qualified in grand social interests” (Ranciere, 2014: 75). This often leads to 
the type of reductionism we have outlined above in the identification of the nascent 
technocratic social innovation paradigm, where those needs and problems which have the 
potential to spark politicization are in fact converted to the depoliticized domain of neoliberal 
economics (Wilson and Swyngedouw, 2014). In contrast, the democratic paradigm offers the 
possibility for social innovation to increase the socio-political capacities of the most excluded 
citizens by transforming uncontested issues into spaces for politics and by mobilizing the 




Using a paradigmatic analysis, we have identified two schools of social innovation -
technocratic and democratic - which are currently engaged in a struggle to ultimately define 
the concept. This has presented us with a clearer picture of the characteristics of each 
paradigm and the motivations of policymakers, practitioners and academics who advocate 
from within each school. The technocratic paradigm, with its neoliberal foundations, 
espouses rhetoric based upon the empowerment of communities but in its actions valorizes 
the role of the expert, mobilizing the technologies of governance to reduce the space for 
political dissent. Despite its claims being articulated under the rubric of participation, we 
hypothesise that its outcomes will only serve to entrench the existing vertical distributions of 
power in society. The democratic paradigm advocated by those who wish to subvert and 
disrupt neoliberalism, embraces not only the participation of communities but also perceives 
the knowledge produced within them as being of equal merit to ‘experts’ (Moulaert et al, 
2013; Jessop et al, 2013 and Ranciere 1991). Moreover, the democratic school conceive 
social innovation as being a tool for politicizing the very spaces which neoliberals have 
sought to depoliticize, challenging the vertical distributions of power in society and seeking 
to disrupt and replace them with horizontal alternatives.       
 
Given the paradigmatic analysis outlined above and the insistence from Kuhn (1962) that no 
research can be paradigm independent, it is perhaps important to confirm that this analysis 
does not occupy an Archimedean point and is itself enmeshed within the struggle between 
both schools of thought. Even though this analysis perceives the world through the prism of 
the democratic paradigm, this does not prevent us from locating the key terrains upon which 
this struggle takes place. Indeed, returning to Kuhn, we can see from his later works on 
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incommensurability that he refined the concept further, finding that, “only for a small 
subgroup of (usually interdefined) terms and for sentences containing them do problems of 
translatability arise” (Kuhn, 1982: 670-1). Therefore in the paradigmatic war between 
democratic and technocratic schools we witness these problems of translation when speaking 
of social capital, empowerment and social innovation itself.  
The paradigmatic analysis outlined thus far has helped us to identify some of the key 
concepts which may escape translation between the different schools, however it is 
impossible to develop a more nuanced analysis without considering that social innovation 
“cannot be separated from either its socio-cultural, or from its social-political context” 
(Moulaert et al, 2013: 17). Therefore it is only through the study of local struggles shall we 
develop a better understanding of which paradigm is succeeding in the battle to define social 
innovation. 
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